Sai v. TSA et al., No. 15-2526 (1st Cir.), cert. forthcoming & Sai v. TSA, No. 16-5004 (D.C. Cir.), No. 16-287 (SCOTUS) [IFP]
Full case documents: 1st, DC, cert | previous SCOTUS cert | Other TSA litigation
Filed 2015-12-15 (1st Cir.) and 2016-01-19 (D.C. Cir.), these two cases appeal the D. MA. and D. D.C. courts' denials of my IFP privacy motion, asking the court to allow me to file for in forma pauperis (aka "broke enough to waive court fees and appoint free lawyer") status with my affidavit under seal (protected from the public) and ex parte (protected from the other side — in this case, including the US government).
I am represented in these cases pro bono by the William & Mary Appellate and Supreme Court Law Clinic and Tillman Breckenridge of Bailey Glasser, who also represented me in a previous cert. petition on the same issue.
Status
-
D.C. Cir.
- Supreme Court
- 2017-01-09: Cert. denied.
- 2016-12-13: Reply re cert
- 2016-12-02: TSA Opposition to cert
- 2016-09-02: Petition for certiorari filed. No. 16-287. See also SCOTUSblog page.
- 2016-06-06: Court dismissed appeal for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction, per Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 980-83 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
- 2016-03-11: Court denied our petition for initial hearing en banc.
- Supreme Court
-
1st Cir.
- 2016-12-07: Court dismissed appeal for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction.
- 2016-07-21: Brief and appendix filed re district court's denial of appointment of counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 and interlocutory appealability thereof.
- 2016-04-27: Court denied our petition for initial hearing en banc re Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1983) — but permitted briefing in light of circuit split.
Next update: TBD (1st Cir. cert. pet. forthcoming)
Press
- 2016-10-11 SCOTUSblog Petition of the day
- 2016-09-29 Clinic Seeks Supreme Court Certification in Civil Case Involving Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Client, William & Mary Appellate and Supreme Court Clinic
Plain English explanation of current issue (Cohen / collateral order jurisdiction)
Before my lawyers can even ask the appeals courts to let me have privacy when asking for a lawyer, they first have to convince the court that it's even appealable in the first place (a.k.a. "jurisdiction").
If you're too poor to afford an attorney, ask for one, and get denied — like I did — in about half the country, you can't appeal that denial immediately.
Instead, you have to first do the entire case yourself (being sure to carefully preserve the issue for appeal, get a final judgment, make no prejudicial errors, etc). If you don't know what those things mean, you probably won't be able to do so.
The 5th, 8th, & Federal Circuits think you can appeal immediately; the 3rd and 9th Circuits think you can do so for some cases but not others; the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, & D.C. Circuits think you can't. I have the unfortunate luck of being in two of the latter group.
Right now, my lawyers are appealing the question whether or not I get to appeal immediately. Yes, it's very meta.
Case law
Collateral appeal doctrine: Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)
Circuit split re whether denial of counsel is collaterally appealable:
- Pro (3rd, 5th, 8th, 9th, & Federal Circuits):
- Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981)
- Spanos v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1972) (denial of appointed counsel in Title VII case immediately appealable)
- Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't, 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986)
- Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1985) (2-1); dissent at 414-18
but see Campanioni v. Barr, 962 F. 2d 461 (5th Cir. 1992) (award of fees due to appointment of CJA counsel not immediately appealable) - Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1977) (denial of appointed counsel in § 1983 case is immediately appealable)
but see Marler v. Adonis, 997 F.2d 1141, 1143 (5th Cir. 1993) (not extending Caston to products liability cases)
adopted by 11th Cir. when splitting from 5th Cir., Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) - Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588 (8th Cir. 1984)
but see Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam, 2-1); dissent at 943-45
and Pena-Calleja v. Ring, 720 F.3d 988, 989 (8th Cir. 2013) (not extending Slaughter to habeas cases) - Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (2-1); dissent at 1320-25
- Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mut. Wat. Co., 459 F. 2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1972) (denial of US Attorney representation for Indians under 25 U.S.C. § 175 immediately appealable)
- Lariscey v. United States, 861 F.2d 1267, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (2-1 on jurisdictional question) (denial of appointed IFP counsel immediately appealable); concurrence in result at 1271-73 (denial of counsel not "effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment"; Claims Court not Article III court, so lacks authority under IFP statute), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 905 (1993)
- Con (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, & D.C. Circuits):
- Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (order denying appointed counsel is subject to revision)
Sai v TSA, No. 15-2526 (1st Cir. Dec. 7, 2016) (per curiam) (same)
- Welch v. Smith, 810 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903 (dissent from denial of cert, J. White & Blackmun)
- Levine v. American Export Industries, Inc., 473 F. 2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1973) (potential conflict of interest in appointed class counsel not immediately appealable)
- Miller v. Pleasure, 425 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880
overruling Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 283 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962) (same case, different panel)
but see United States v. Harris, 707 F. 2d 653 (2d. Cir. 1983) (order terminating CJA counsel immediately appealable) - Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1984) (2-1) (denial of appointed IFP counsel not immediately appealable); dissent at 26
- Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903 (dissent from denial of cert, J. White & Blackmun)
same, United States v. Hutto, No. 90-7070, 914 F.2d 249 (4th Cir., Sept 18, 1990) (unpublished, per curiam)
- Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dep’t, 763 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc, 8-1-4) (orders denying appointed counsel are presumptively tentative); concurrence in result at 764-765 ("conclusive" prong of Cohen test satisfied); dissent at 765-72; dissent at 772, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036 (dissent from denial of cert, J. White & Blackmun)
- Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam, 2-1); dissent at 1067-69
- Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1330 fn. 2 (9th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing denials of appointed counsel in Title VII cases from denials under § 1915 for purposes of immediate appealability)
- Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1983) (not extending Bradshaw to habeas cases)
- Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
- Hodges v. Department of Corrections, State of Ga., 895 F. 2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (Holt implicitly overruled Caston; no basis for distinguishing denial of counsel in § 1983 cases from Title VII cases)
- Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc, 8-4) (denial of appointed counsel in § 1915 not immediately reviewable); dissent at 855-59
- Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 980-83 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
- Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (order denying appointed counsel is subject to revision)
Other cases:
- Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate, Inc., 865 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1988)
- Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (7-1) (order disqualifying counsel in civil case not immediately appealable); dissent at 442-44
- Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (order disqualifying counsel in criminal case not immediately appealable)
- Ponce-Bran v. Trustees of Cal. State University, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1656, 1662 (CA. Ct. App. 3rd Dist. 1996) (under CA law, denial of counsel is collateral and final, but doesn't order payment or injunction, so is not appealable)
- Duttry v. Talkish, 576 A. 2d 53 (Pa. 1990) (under PA law, appointment of counsel in case seeking custody not immediately appealable)
Law reviews:
- Brad D. Feldman, Note, An Appeal for Immediate Appealability: Applying the Collateral Order Doctrine to Orders Denying Appointed Counsel in Civil Rights Cases, 99 Geo. L.J. 1717, 1739–44 (2011)
- Kimberly A. Owens, Right to Counsel - The Third Circuit Delivers Indigent Civil Litigants from Exceptional Circumstances, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1163 (1994)
- Jeffery Hanslick, Decisions Denying the Appointment of Counsel and the Final Judgment Rule in Civil Rights Litigation, 86 Nw. L. Rev. 782, 801-06 (1992)
- Appealability, under the Collateral Order Doctrine, of Orders Denying Motions for Appointment of Counsel in Federal Civil Litigation after Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 3 Touro L. Rev. 229 (1986-1987)
- James P. Weygandt, Note, Motions for Appointment of Counsel and the Collateral Order Doctrine, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1547-70 (1985)
- Appealability of Federal Court Order Denying Motion for Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Party, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 925 (1984)
- Nicolas Swerdloff, Note, Denial of a Pro Se Litigant's Motion to Appoint Counsel: The Preclusive Effect of Refusing Immediate Review, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 1399 (1982)
Appointment of counsel statutes:
- 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (Criminal Justice Act, criminal defendants)
- 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (in forma pauperis, civil cases)
- 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (disability discrimination in public accommodations operated by private entities)
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (general disability discrimination)
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (employment disability discrimination)
- 25 U.S.C. § 175 (Indian reservation cases)
- 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (Indian child custody cases)
- 52 U.S.C. § 10101(f), formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1971(f) (Voting Rights Act defendants)
- FRCP 23(g)(1) (certified class action), (g)(3) (interim counsel for putative class action)